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ABSTRACT
Thispaper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted
to reflect administrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending
onwhether the administrative costs are fixed per firmtaxed or are a func-
tionof the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne
by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases, the presence of
administrative costs increases the optimal tax above the external cost,
while in other cases it leads to a decrease in the tax.












Whenever a Pigouvian tax is used to control an external-
ity-generating activity, "administrative" costs are incurred.
These costs might be borne by the government or by the taxed
party--assumed for concreteness to be a firm. They include
the time spent in filling out forms, the cost of having the
activity monitored, and the expense of resolving disputes
over tax liability. Some administrative costs, such as
those involved in filling out forms, depend only on the
number of firms, taxed and not on the tax revenue collected;
these will be referred to as "fixed" per firm. Other admin-
istrative costs, such as the expense of resolving disputes,
may depend on the amount of tax collected (e.g., legal
expenditures may rise with the size of the dispute); these
will be referred to as "variable" per firm.
This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax
should be adjusted to reflect administrative costs when the
administrative costs are fixed or variable and when they are
borne by the government or the taxed firmJ As is well
known, in the absence of administrative costs, the tax
should equal the external cost. It is shown here that when
there are fixed administrative costs borne by the government,
the tax should exceed the external cost. This is because
raising the tax above the external cost reduces the number
of firms which engage in the activity and thereby saves
administrative costs. However, raising the tax causes those
firms which do participate in the activity to choose too4
low a level of activity; the administrative cost of taxing
these firms is "sunk," so, with respect to them, the closer
the tax is to the external cost, the better. This limits
the extent to which the tax should be raised.
If, on the other hand, the fixed administrative costs
are borne by the taxed firms, the tax should equal the
external cost. In this case, it is not desirable to raise
the tax in order to reduce the number of firms which engage
in the activity because their bearing of the administrative
costs already accomplishes this (to an appropriate extent).
By setting the tax equal to the external cost, those firms
which do engage in the activity are induced to choose the
correct level of activity.
When the administrative costs are variable and borne by
the government, the optimal tax could be above or below the
external cost. For example, if the activity levels of those
firms which engage in the activity are not very responsive
to changes in the tax, then lowering the tax reduces tax
revenue and thereby saves administrative cost. This savings
may make it desirable to lower the tax. Similarly, if firms
are very responsive to the tax, it may be optimal to raise
the tax above the external cost.
Finally, if the variable administrative costs are borne
by the taxed firms, the optimal tax is below the external
cost. This result will be explained below.5
2.THE MODEL
The model analyzed here has the following features.
Risk neutral firms derive benefits from engaging in an
activity which imposes a constant external harm per unit of
activity. Each firm is described by its schedule of bene-
fits from participating in the activity at different levels.
The government imposes a tax per unit of activity. A firm's
problem is to choose a level of activity to maximize its
profits--its benefits less its tax payments and less any
administrative costs it bears. One possibility is that the
firmchoosesnot to participate in the activity at all. The
government's problem is to choose the tax rate to maximize
social welfare subject to the constraint that firms maximize
profits. Social welfare equals the benefits to those firms
which engage in the activity less the external harm they
impose and less administrative costs, whether borne by the
firms or the government. The following notation will be
used:
x activity level of a firm (x0)
X parameter defining the benefit schedule of a firm
(0A 1)
f(X) density of A-type firms (f(X) >0,ff(X)dA=1)
b(x,X) benefit to a A-type firm from engaging in the
activity at level x (b >0, <0,bx >0,
bx >0,b(O,X) 0)
e external harm per unit of activity
t tax per unit of activity6
Thus, each firm's problem is:
(1) Max b(x,A) -tx-(administrativecosts),
x
where the administrative costs are only a possibility and
may be of the fixed or variablekind.2 Let x(A,t) be the
activity level chosen by a A-type firm given a tax t; if
x(A,t) =0,this means that the firm does not participate in
the activity at all. Note that a higher A corresponds to a
higher benefit schedule; thus, for any tax t, there will be
a critical value of the benefit parameter, denoted A(t),
such that firms with A below A(t) will choose not to engage
in the activity at all, and firms with A exceeding X(t) will
engage in the activity at a positive level.





The first term represents the benefits to those firms which
engage in the activity and the second term represents the
external harm they impose. The government's problem is to
choose t to maximize
3.NO ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
For purposes of comparison, it will be useful to verify
that if there are no administrative costs, then setting the
tax equal to the external harm is optimal. To see this,
maximize social welfare (2) assuming that there are no







This can be simplified by noting that firms which are just
indifferent between participating and not choose an activity
level of zero: x(X(t),t) = Also,since each firm which
does participate chooses its level of activity so as to
maximize its benefits net of taxes, b(x,t) -tx,it follows




which implies that te (since xt(X,t)
4.FIXED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS PER FIRM
Now suppose that there is a fixed administrative cost
per firm taxed, represented by a. The administrative cost














As noted in the introduction, the administrative costs might
be borne by the government or by the firms themselves.
4.1 Borne by the Government
In this case, since (from the previous section)
x(A(t),t) =0and b(x(X,t),A) =t,(5) reduces to
(6) t =e+A'(t)f((t)) 1a. 11
I-fxt(X,t)f(x)dA
LX(t)
The terminbrackets is positive since X'(t) >0(the higher
the tax, the higher the minimum A required for firms to be
just willing to engage in the activity), since f(A(t)) >0
(there are some firms which are just indifferent between
engaging in the activity and not), and since xt(A,t) <0
(the higher the tax, the lower the level of activity chosen).
Thus, the optimal tax exceeds the external cost.
In order to understand this result consider two extreme
cases. First, suppose that all firms strictly preferred to
engage in the activity, or, equivalently, all firms had a A
exceeding X(t). Then f(X(t)) would be zero, so that, from
(6), the optimal tax would equal the external cost. This is
true for the following reason. The administrative costs
would be a sunk cost for society. Consequently, all that
would matter would be that firms choose the appropriate
activity level, and to achieve this the tax should equal the
external cost.9
Second, suppose that if a firmparticipatesin the
activity, it does so at a fixed level--say a unit level of
activity--and that the benefits to a A-type firm from parti-
cipation are A. Then, of course, there could not be any
effect of the tax on the activity level; the tax would
affect only the decision whether to engage in the activity.
Since by participating in the activity the firm would impose
on society the external cost plus the administrative costs,
the optimal tax would equal the sum of those two costs.6
These two cases illustrate respectively the effect of
the tax on the activity levels of firms and the effect of
the tax on the number of firms engaging in the activity, and
hence on the magnitude of administrative costs. As seen,
the first effect tends to make the optimal tax close to the
external cost and the second to raise it above the external
cost.7 However, it should beexplained why the second
effect is always strong enough to raise the optimal tax
above the external cost. If the tax were equal to the
external cost, then the activity levels of firms which
choose to participate in the activity would be correct.
Thus, the effect on social welfare of a marginal change in
their activity levels would be zero. However, if the tax
were equal to the external cost, the effect on social welfare
of a marginal reduction in the number of firms that partici-
pate in the activity would be positive (this is the second
effect). Hence, a small increase in the tax above the
external cost would increase social welfare.10
4.2 Borne by Firms
In this case, for a firm to be indifferent between
participating and not, it must be true that
b(x(X(t),t),X(t)) -tx(X(t),t)-a=0.
Thus, since b(x(X,t),A) =t,(5) implies that t =e.As
noted in the introduction, because firms bear the adminis-
trative cost, they make the correct decision whether to
participate in the activity; and by setting the tax equal to
the external cost, those firms which do participate are
induced to choose the correct level of activity.
5.VARIABLE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS PER FIRM
In this section, suppose that the administrative cost
per firm taxed depends on the amount of the tax. Specific-
ally, let a(tx) be the administrative cost when the tax
collected is tx, and assume that a(O) =0and that a' > 0.













where the arguments in the integrand of the last term have
been omitted.11
5.1 Borne by the GoVernment
Asbefore, x(A(t),t) =0and b(x(A,t)iX) =t.There-







Observe that f(x +tx)a'f(X)dXis the impact on administra-
tive costs of a marginal increase in the tax rate. This
consists of a positive direct effect due to the increase in
the tax given firms' existing levels of activity (J'xa'f(X)dA)
and a negative indirect effect due to reductions in firms'
levels of activity (ftxta'f(X)dA). Either effect may dominate.
Thus, the optimal tax could be above or below the external
cost.
To better understand this result, suppose the tax were
equal to the external cost. Then firms will be led to
consider the effect of their behavior on the external costs
(and, of course, on their own benefits), but not on adminis-
trative costs. Therefore, it will be beneficial to change
the tax to reduce the unaccounted for administrative costs.
This may require raising or lowering the tax for the reasons
noted in the previous paragraph. For a small change in the
tax, the resulting effect on social welfare due to changes
in firms' benefits and their external costs would be zero
since, with respect to these considerations, their activity
levels would have been correctly chosen.12
5.2 Borne by Firms








Note that fxa'f(X)dX is the effect on administrative costs
of a marginal increase in the tax rate given firms' existing
levels of activity. Since this effect is positive, the
optimal tax is unambiguously less than the external cost
(since x. <0).
The explanation of this result is as follows. Suppose
the tax were equal to the external cost. As in the previous
case, firms will be led to consider the effect of their
behavior on the external cost and their own benefits. But
since they now bear the administrative costs, they will also
be led to consider the indirect effect of changes in their
activity levels on the administrative costs. However, firms
cannot consider the direct effect of changes in the tax on
administrative costs. By lowering the tax, administrative
costs are reduced at the existing levels of activity. The
resulting effects on social welfare due to changes in firms'
benefits, the external costs, and the administrative costs
would be zero since, with respect to these considerations,
their activity levels were correct.13
6.NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
To illustrate the effect of administrative costs on the
optimal Pigouvian tax, some examples have been computed
using specific functional forms. In each case, the external
cost is $5.00 per unit of activity and the parameter defining
the benefit schedule, A, is assumed to be uniformly distrib-
uted between 0 and 1. The examples differ in terms of who
bears the administrative cost and in terms of the benefit
schedules.
Table 1 shows how the optimal tax rises when thereare
fixed administrative costs borne by thegovernment. For
administrative costs of $50 per firm, the optimal tax is
nearly twice the magnitude of the external cost.
Table 2 illustrates how the optimal tax is affected
when there are variable administrative costs. As demon-
strated above, if these costs are borne by the government,
the optimal tax might be higher or lower than the external
cost. Both cases are shown in Table 2. For administrative
costs of $0.50 for every dollar collected in taxes, the
optimal tax rises 33% over the external cost in one case and
falls 78% in the other. Table 2 also shows how the
optimal tax falls when the variable administrative costs are
borne by the taxed firm. For administrative costs of $0.50























Variable Admin- Borne by the Government Borne by the Firm
istrative Cost Optimal Optimal Optimal
Tax a Tb TaxC
.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
.05 5.13 3.86 4.88
.10 5.26 3.11 4.76
.15 5.41 2.57 4.65
.20 5.56 2.18 4.55
.25 5.72 1.89 4.44
.30 5.88 1.66 4.35
.35 6.06 1.47 4.26
.40 6.25 1.32 4.17
.45 6.45 1.20 4.08
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1.The only other analytical studies of administra-
tive costs and taxation have been in the context
of "optimal taxation," in which the problem is
typically to choose excise or income taxes to
raise a fixed amount of revenue with least dead-
weight burden (rather than, as here, to internalize
an externality) .Inthis context, Heller and
Shell (1974) characterize administrative costs in
a very general way and examine whether, given such
costs, it is desirable for production to be efficient.
Yitzhaki (1979) considers the tradeoff between
higher administrative costs and lower deadweight
burden as the number of taxed commodities increases.
Stern (forthcoming) compares optimal income taxation
to lump sum taxation when the taxing authority
makes errors in classifying individuals. Also,17
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, PP. 359—360, 455)
have noted the desirability of incorporating
administrative costs in the analysis of taxation.
2. It will be assumed that a solution to (1) exists.
Uniqueness is guaranteed (since <0)when the
firm does not bear any administrative costsor,
when the firm does bear such costs, if they are
fixed; when the firm bears variable administrative
costs, uniqueness is assumed.
3.It will be assumed that a unique interior solution
to this problem exists.
4.Since these firms are just indifferent between
participating and not, their profits must be zero.
Now if it were strictly optimal for these firms to
participate at a positive level, then their profits
would have to be greater than they would be ata
zero level of activity. But their profits at a
zero level of activity are zero.
5.This result can be derived in a simpler,more
direct way. The first-best solution--what the
government would order if it had complete con-
trol——is to have each firm choose a level of
activity x which maximizes b(x,X) -ex.Since the
firm's problem is to maximize b(x,A) -tx,setting
t =ewill induce the firm to choose the first-best
level of activity. This result was derived inthe
text by maximizing the social welfare function
because later results require use of thismethod.18
6.This result can easily be seen to follow from (2)
with b(x(A,t),t)A and x(A,t) 1.
7.The fact that in (6) a higher a, f(X(t)), or
At(t) tends to raise t reflects the second effect.
8. If a(O) were positive, then there would be some
fixed administrative costs per firm. The assump-
tion that a(O) =0is made in order to isolate the
effect of variable administrative costs on the
optimal tax.19
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